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Abstract:  
We examine the contrast in the experience of ownership reforms between urban SOEs and rural TVEs 
using a panel of industrial enterprises in Nanjing municipality for the period from 1994 to 2001.  Our 
objectives are twofold.  First, we study how the reform program of “grasp the large and let go of the 
small” has been carried out in practice by comparing the patterns of enterprise restructuring in the SOEs 
and the TVEs.  Second, we investigate how the alternative reform strategy has affected firm performance 
in terms of the growth of labor productivity, total factor productivity (TFP), profitability, and worker 
earnings.  We find a sharp contrast in the reform strategies of the SOEs and TVEs in two respects. First, 
the changes in the SOE sector were more gradual and involved more limited transfer of property rights 
than did the reform of the TVEs. Secondly, the reforms in both sectors exhibited selection bias but in 
opposite directions, with worse performing ones being the principal targets of reforms, among SOEs, and 
better performing enterprises being more likely to be picked for privatization, among TVEs. Our analysis 
discerns strikingly strong, robust positive effects of ownership restructuring on the growth of labor 
productivity, TFP and profitability in the reformed SOEs, indicating that the evolutionary reform policy 
for the SOEs has successfully reversed the trends of declining productivity and profits in these enterprises 
in Nanjing. We also find that among reformed urban enterprises, those in which private ownership 
accounts for less than 50% of shares performed better than those in which the majority of shares are 
owned privately.  We find mixed evidence for the TVEs: privatization had no effect on firm performance 
in a group fixed-effects model but significant, positive effects in a firm fixed-effects model.   
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A Comparison of Rural and Urban Enterprises in Jiangsu Province 
 
1. Introduction
∗  
    Since the early 1980s, privatization has been a widely adopted strategy for addressing governance 
problems in publicly owned enterprises throughout the world.  However, privatizing large enterprises is a 
formidable task for transition economies where market institutions are weak and private capital is largely 
unavailable.  Despite the obstacles, most transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe have carried 
out privatization at high speed. The rapid mass privatization was achieved primarily through subsidized 
management-employee buyouts and equal-access voucher schemes (Gray, 1996).   
  The privatization experience of Central and Eastern Europe suggests that the “big bang” approach 
to privatization in the absence of well-functioning market institutions has several undesirable economic 
and social consequences (Svejnar, 2002).  The process did not raise much new capital for privatized 
enterprises nor did it bring large revenues to the governments concerned.  Moreover, without competitive 
capital markets, the ownership structure created by the privatization process was often either too 
dispersed for effective governance or else it concentrated too much power in the hands of people who 
lacked adequate incentives to restructure the enterprises.  The resultant inefficient governance structure 
was difficult to correct because of institutional inertia.  Furthermore, in those countries where social 
networks independent of the ruling Communist party were weak prior to privatization, the non-market 
approach to privatization led to a high concentration of wealth in the hands of more powerful 
stakeholders, such as the managers in Russia (Alexeev, 1999; Black, Kraakman and Tarassova, 2000; 
Roland, 2002).   
  Unlike the Eastern European countries, China has taken an evolutionary approach to reforming 
the ownership structure of public enterprises.  For the first 15 years of the transition to the market, the 
reforms of state and collectively owned enterprises focused on the increase of managerial autonomy and 
the improvement of work incentives, along with the development of non-state sectors and market 
institutions.  In the late 1980s, with rural industries growing more slowly and the financial performance of 
the urban collective and state sectors deteriorating, some local governments began to privatize locally 
owned enterprises, known as township and village enterprises (TVEs).  In late 1992, China’s leaders 
formally endorsed private property rights and initiated ownership reforms in public enterprises at the 14
th 
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.  While the government decided to withdraw state ownership 
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radically from small- and medium-size enterprises in competitive sectors, the approach to reforming large 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), described by the so called “modern enterprises system” program, 
remained cautious and gradual. Under this program, the government maintains its control over large SOEs 
in key strategic sectors and reforms these enterprises by converting them into corporations with more 
clearly defined property rights and transferable ownership. These reform policies, described as “grasp the 
large and let go of the small” (zhudafangxiao), were reaffirmed during the 15
th Congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party in September 1997.  With the spontaneous movement from below and the 
encouragement from above, China’s industry has seen an enormous wave of ownership restructuring 
since the late 1990s. 
  Because ownership restructuring in China’s industry is a relatively recent event, empirical studies 
of the reform process and its impacts have just begun to emerge.  Jefferson et al. (2003) provided a 
statistical description of the ownership reform with the data on the full population of 22,000 large- and 
medium-size enterprises for the period from 1994 to 1999.  They found that during the period of 
investigation the state’s share of both enterprises and assets had fallen to one half and that the declining 
share of state ownership was correlated with rising rates of growth in labor productivity and total factor 
productivity in SOEs. Using a survey of 683 SOEs in 11 cities for the years of 1995 to 2001, Garnaut, et. 
al. (2003) documented the process of ownership restructuring in the state sector.  The authors reported 
that while more than 80 percent of SOEs claimed to have completed property rights reforms, the 
transformation of ownership from the state to private investors had been rather slow. Yao and Song 
(2003) examined the impacts of ownership changes on enterprise performance using the same data set.  
They found that the shift of ownership rights from the state to private investors improved the profitability 
of firms but had no effect on unit cost and labor productivity.  Sun, Tong and Tong (2002) estimated the 
effects of privatization on SOEs listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange.  An inverted U-shape relationship between firm performance and degree of privatization was 
found.    
  A number of empirical studies examined the changes in China’ rural industry.  Commentators 
were astonished by the magnitude and speed of privatization of TVEs. During a short period from 1995 to 
2000, the vast majority of TVEs had been transferred or sold to enterprise insiders: managers and 
employees.  Kung and Lin (2000), Park and Shen (2003), and Li (2003) investigated the reasons why 
such a sweeping change in property rights occurred in TVEs, a group of enterprises whose dynamic 
performance in the early years of reforms had both impressed and puzzled economists.  The change in 
ideological commitment, shifts in the preference of financial institutions, and increased market 
competition have been identified as being among the chief factors that contributed to the massive 
privatization of TVEs in the late 1990s.   Li and Rozelle (forthcoming) estimated the impact of   4
privatization on TVE performance with a sample of 88 privatized TVEs from Jiangsu and Zhejiang for 
the period from 1994 to 1997.  The reform was found to have a significant positive effect on labor 
productivity.  With a survey of 45 TVEs in Shandong and Jiangsu in 2000, Bowles, Dong and Ho (2003) 
found evidence that privatization had increased efficiency by making managers more responsible for the 
use of enterprise assets and by making firms more profit oriented.              
  In this paper, we examine the contrast in the experience of ownership reforms between urban SOEs 
and rural TVEs using a panel of industrial enterprises in Nanjing municipality for the period from 1994 to 
2001.  Our objectives are twofold.  First, we study how the reform program of “grasp the large and let go 
of the small” has been carried out in practice by comparing the patterns of enterprise restructuring in the 
SOEs and the TVEs.  Second, we investigate how the alternative reform strategy has affected firm 
performance in terms of the growth of labor productivity, total factor productivity (TFP), profitability, 
and worker earnings.  We find a sharp contrast in the reform strategies of the SOEs and TVEs in two 
aspects. First, the changes in the SOE sector were more gradual and involved fairly limited transfer of 
property rights to private investors relative to the TVEs. Secondly, the reforms in both sectors exhibited 
selection bias but in opposite directions, with worse performing ones being the principal targets of 
reforms, among SOEs, and better performing enterprises being more likely to be picked for privatization, 
among TVEs. Our analysis discerns strikingly strong, robust positive effects of ownership restructuring 
on the growth of labor productivity, TFP and profitability in the reformed SOEs, indicating that the 
evolutionary reform policy for the SOEs has successfully reversed the trends of declining productivity 
and profits in these enterprises in Nanjing. We also find that among reformed urban enterprises, those in 
which private ownership accounts for less than 50% of shares performed better than those in which the 
majority of shares are owned privately.  We find mixed evidence for the TVEs that privatization had no 
effect on firm performance in the group fixed-effects model but significant, positive effects in the firm 
fixed-effects model.   
  The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data set and examines 
the difference in reform strategies between different types of public enterprises. Section 3 outlines the 
methodology for empirical analysis. The empirical results are reported in section 4. Section 5 provides 
brief conclusions.         
 
2. The Data    
The data used in this present paper are derived from a survey of 168 manufacturing enterprises 
that was undertaken in cooperation with China’s National Statistical Bureau (NBS) in the summer of 
2002. The enterprises in the sample were randomly selected from those affiliated with the central, 
provincial and municipal governments located in Nanjing Metropolitan area and enterprises owned by   5
township governments in 7 counties within the jurisdiction of the Nanjing municipal government.  As the 
capital of one of the fast growing coastal provinces and the heartland of the rural collective sector in 
China—Jiangsu province—Nanjing provides a desirable sample site for comparing reform experience of 
urban and rural public enterprises in China.  The sample of 168 firms accounts for 8.6% of the 1,963 
manufacturing firms with a “designated size” of 5 million yuan or more in annual sales in Nanjing city 
and for 26% of the 634 public enterprises that had undergone enterprise restructuring (gaizhi) by 2002. 
These sample enterprises are distributed over 46 4-digit industrial branches.  The data were collected 
through an enterprise survey and a manager survey.  Using the enterprise survey we obtained information 
on industrial codes, ownership categories, output, sales revenue, fixed assets, equity, employment, labor 
compensation, intermediate inputs, investment expenditures on new technologies, and profits.  The 
manager survey provides us with information on the privatization process and reform methods.   
The enterprise panel covers the period from 1994 to 2001. The choice of 1994 as the starting date 
of the panel is due to the fact that China’s industrial enterprises adopted a new accounting system that is 
more consistent with international conventions in that year, and hence the data prior to 1994 are not 
comparable with those in the later years. The analysis of this paper focuses on 165 enterprises the 
ownership categories of which prior to the reform can be identified using information obtained from the 
two surveys.  In accordance with the ownership classification of 1994, there are 60 SOEs, 10 UCs (urban 
collectives), and 95 TVEs in the sample.  The summary statistics presented in Table 1 shed light on the 
main characteristics of the three types of enterprises.  Measured by the means of gross value of industrial 
output, net value of fixed assets, employment, and equity value, a typical SOE is substantially larger than 
a UC and a TVE, whereas a UC is bigger than a TVE.  For instance, the average equity value of a SOE is, 
respectively, 26 and 56 times that of a UC and of a TVE.  As mentioned in the introduction, in the 
absence of well-developed capital markets, privatization is more difficult for large enterprises than for 
small ones.               
While the 165 sample enterprises were all classified by our Chinese NBS collaborators as gaizhi-
qiye  (the Chinese term for enterprises that have undergone a system change), for an appreciable 
proportion of the enterprises, especially SOEs, gaizhi did not lead to any substantive change in ownership 
structure. To discern the scope and pace of ownership change, we derived two sets of reform indicators, 
the first based on the classification of each enterprise by official ownership category or type (SOEs, 
TVEs, etc.), and the second based on the proportions of equity owned by private individuals versus 
governments.  
The type-based indicator of reform is defined on the basis of whether the ownership classification 
of an enterprise had changed, judging by the ownership code reported in the enterprise panel data and   6
supplementary information from the manager survey.
1  During the period of investigation 38 of the 60 
SOEs changed ownership classification, with 11 becoming shareholding companies, 20 limited 
companies that were not wholly state owned, 5 shareholding cooperatives, and 2 private limited 
companies. These enterprises are defined as reformed SOEs in the empirical analysis.  Of the 10 UCs 3 
became shareholding cooperatives and 5 were converted to limited companies.  Except for four 
enterprises, almost all of the 95 TVEs had changed ownership classification with 23 becoming 
shareholding cooperatives, 6 limited companies, and 62 private firms. Because shareholding cooperatives 
are usually regarded as one type of collective firms in the literature,
2 only those UCs and TVEs that had 
been transformed into limited liability companies or private firms are classified as reformed ones in our 
empirical investigation.   
The second set of reform indicators that we use is derived from information on equity ownership 
obtained from the enterprise panel. Because the sample size of UCs is small and the ownership structure 
of UCs is more similar to that of SOEs than TVEs, SOEs and UCs are combined as one group which we 
call “urban enterprises.”  Each group is then divided into three classes: 100% publicly-owned, partially 
privatized but publicly-controlled (i.e., public ownership still exceeds 50%), and privately-controlled 
firms (i.e., private ownership is between 50 and 100%).    
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the reform indicators. These statistics reveal sharp 
contrasts in the scope and pace of change between different types of public enterprises.  Specifically, the 
reform process began earlier but proceeded more slowly in the SOEs and UCs than in the TVEs. Based on 
the indicators of ownership-category shift, 10 to 13 percent of the UCs and SOEs had already undergone 
substantive restructuring by 1994, but the proportion only rose to 50 to 63 percent in 2001. By contrast, 
the change did not begin in the TVEs until 1996; however, nearly three quarters of the enterprises had 
been converted into partially privatized limited companies or wholly privately owned firms by 2001. 
Moreover, compared with the rural TVEs, the scope of privatization for the two types of urban public 
enterprises was fairly limited.  By 2001, on average only 25.4% of the equity of the urban enterprises was 
owned by private investors, and the firms that became privately controlled only accounted for 16.7% of 
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2 For example, see Jefferson, et. at. (2003).  Theoretically, shareholding cooperatives are the enterprises in 
which dividends are distributed according to share ownership but major decisions are made based on the 
principle of one member one vote. It has been reported that some privatized TVEs that did not meet this 
criterion were also registered as shareholding cooperatives (Ho, Bowles and Dong, 2003).  However, by 
excluding shareholding cooperatives from reformed UCs and TVEs we are able to focus on the impact of 
transformation of collective enterprises into conventional firms.     
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these enterprises. In contrast, private investors owned 68.9% of the equity and controlled 72.9% of the 
rural TVEs in the sample.  
While both urban and rural enterprises were privatized primarily to enterprise insiders, i.e., 
managers and employees, the distribution of equity ownership over private investors was more skewed 
towards managers in the reformed rural enterprises than in their urban counterparts.  In contrast to the 
growing managerial ownership concentration observed among privatized rural enterprises, the proportion 
of private equity owned by employees in the urban enterprises was rising over time; the distribution 
between managers and employees became more or less equally split by 2001.  It is noteworthy that the 
governments at both the township level and the levels above appear to be revenue conscious in that the 
privatization of both urban and rural enterprises did not entail substantial free transfers of public assets as 
observed in many countries in Eastern Europe.  The managers and employees in both sectors were, on 
average, expected to pay 76 to 88 percent, respectively, of the value of the shares they acquired,
3 and 73 
to 94 percent of these inside private investors paid, respectively, the full amount due up front.  Judging by 
the proportion of the purchase price paid up front, the transformation of ownership from the government 
to private investors seems to be more complete with the employee shareholders than the managers and 
more thorough in the urban enterprises than the rural TVEs. Having inside private investors pay for their 
share acquisition is not only more desirable for state revenues but also likely to have stronger incentive 
effects, compared with the scheme of free transfers.
4    
Having reviewed the striking difference in the approach to enterprise restructuring between 
different types of public enterprises, we now turn to our investigation of how the reform affected 
enterprise performance across ownership types.  We examine four aspects of firm performance: labor 
productivity, total factor productivity (TFP), profits per unit of fixed assets, and worker earnings.  TFP 
and profitability provide comprehensive measures of performance in terms of technical and economic 
efficiency.  Labor productivity is introduced as a more partial indicator of productivity which is 
particularly sensitive to changes in the workforce and capital stock. While labor productivity, TFP and 
profitability measure enterprise accomplishment in efficiency, the analysis of earnings sheds light on the 
impact of privatization on workers.  We measure labor productivity by two indicators: value-added per 
worker and sales revenues per worker. Value-added and sales revenues are both converted to 1994 
constant RMB using the ex-factory price index of industrial products as the deflator.  A TFP index is 
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and the enterprise and assessment by an outside evaluator.  External evaluation accounted for about 82 
and 91% of the sample SOEs and UCs and 48% of the sample TVEs.   
4 Using the ratio of the up front payment to the value of the shares acquired at the time of privatization as 
a measure of the completeness of ownership transfer, Li and Rozelle (forthcoming) found that the ratio is 
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derived with the assumptions that a Cobb-Douglas production function adequately describes the firms’ 
technology and that the factor share is 0.6 for labor and 0.4 for capital.  In the calculation, output is 
measured by gross value of industrial output (GVIO); labor is the number of employees at year-end; and 
capital is net value of fixed assets (NVFA).  GVIO is also measured in 1994 RMB using the same price 
deflator as for value-added and sales revenues.  The real value of NVFA is calculated using the recursive 
method developed by Jefferson, et. al.(1992) and the price index of investment in fixed assets.  As a 
measure of profitability, we look at total profits divided by original value of fixed assets. Our earnings 
measure is the average annual earnings of production workers, which consist of wages, bonuses and 
dividends, and is deflated by the consumer price index with 1994 as base year. All the price deflators are 
obtained from China’s Statistical Yearbook.  
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the annual rates of growth of labor productivity, TFP, 
and worker’s earnings and the level of profits per unit of assets for the enterprises in our sample over the 
period from 1994 to 2001.
5 The statistics reported in part I of the table are computed over six enterprise 
groups divided by the indicators of ownership-category shift mentioned before.  Comparing the three 
types of unreformed public enterprises, we observe a familiar ranking of performance, that is, urban 
public enterprises, i.e., SOEs and UCs, were trailing behind rural TVEs by most efficiency measures.  A 
comparison between the reformed and the unreformed enterprises in each sector indicates that the pre-
reform performance records of the eventually reformed SOEs and UCs were noticeably worse than that of 
their counterparts that were not later reformed, whereas the pre-reform gap between later reformed and 
unreformed TVEs in most measures was negligible. The performance of both reformed SOEs and TVEs 
appears to have improved in the post-reform period, but the magnitude of change in the reformed SOEs 
was more striking, with a sharp reverse of the trends of declining labor productivity, TFP and workers’ 
earnings and a turnaround from the money-losing situation. However, the restructuring seems to have 
failed to stop the further deterioration of performance for UCs in the post-reform period.    
Part II of Table 3 reports summary statistics for the enterprise groups that eventually exhibited 
different degrees of privatization. As with the reformed SOEs and UCs, the two types of urban enterprises 
that were eventually partly or mainly privatized appear to be among those enterprises with worse 
performance records within the sector, compared with the urban enterprises that were to remain 100% 
publicly owned.  By contrast, the eventually privatized rural TVEs were, on average, more productive and 
more profitable prior to the privatization than the TVEs that were to remain 100% owned by local 
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difference in the value of the variable in log form between periods t-1 and t.  We report the level instead 
of growth rate for profits because this variable has a large number of observations with negative values.  
As with most firm-level databases, the values of some variables in our data set fluctuate widely, despite 
our strenuous efforts to clean up the data.        9
governments. Regarding the post-privatization performance, resembling the reformed SOEs, the urban 
enterprises that were partially privatized but remained publicly controlled displayed remarkable 
improvement of performance by all measures. The post-privatization records of the majority private urban 
enterprises were mixed, with lower rates of growth in labor productivity and TFP and faster growth in 
worker earnings and higher rate of profits.  Like the reformed TVEs defined on the basis of ownership-
category shift, both types of privatized rural enterprises failed to register significant post-reform 
improvement by most indicators.  However, it is inappropriate to draw inferences concerning the 
performance-ownership relationship from these summary statistics alone, since the patterns revealed by 
these statistics may be attributable to many factors.  The impact of these factors is next studied by 
econometric analysis.             
                                             
3.  Econometric Specification 
 
The central question of this paper concerns the effects of ownership restructuring on firm 
performance by different type of reformed public enterprises.  Specifically, we wish to investigate if the 
reform had stronger positive effects in the rural sector than in the urban sector, as the change in the former 
was accompanied with more rapid and more extensive transfer of property rights to private investors and 
a higher degree of ownership concentration in the hands of managers than that in the latter.  One main 
obstacle to an accurate assessment of reform effects is possible selection bias.  As indicated by the 
descriptive statistics presented in Table 3, firm performance may have been a determining factor in which 
firms were picked for restructuring and by what method.  A reverse causality between performance and 
the choice of ownership type generates biased and inconsistent estimates. 
To address the concern about selection bias, we assess the effects of enterprise restructuring on 
firm performance using two versions of the panel data treatment model (Frydman, et. al., 1999).  In this 
framework, reform is expressed as the treatment variable and possible selection bias is controlled as 
group- or firm-specific fixed effects.  The same two sets of reform variables and group classifications are 
adopted in this analysis as in Section 2, that is one based on change in ownership code and the other on 
the scope of private equity ownership.  To obtain consistent estimates of reform effects, we also control 
for other factors that may affect post-reform performance, such as initial conditions, macroeconomic 
environment, market structure of industrial branches, and access to credit markets.  The control for these 
factors is particularly important for a proper comparison of reform effects between the rural and the urban 
enterprises. For instance, due to the law of diminishing returns, reformed SOEs and UCs may register 
higher rates of growth than reformed TVEs simply because they were less productive prior to the reform.  
Moreover, the assessment of post-reform performance could be less favorable to TVEs than SOEs and 
UCs due to the fact that the majority of the TVEs were privatized after 1997 when China’s economy   10
experienced a recession following the Asian Financial crisis, whereas the number of reformed urban 
enterprises was distributed more evenly over the period of investigation.  Furthermore, the skewed 
sectoral distribution with SOEs being more concentrated in protected sectors and TVEs more in 
competitive sectors may lead to inflated performance effects for SOEs relative to TVEs.  Lastly, it has 
been well recognized that state enterprises have better access to bank loans relative to non-state 
enterprises.
6 The difference in the ability to obtain credit can also lead to differentiated effects on firm 
performance.  Thus, the efforts to control for the differences in initial conditions, the timing of reform, the 
distribution over industrial branches, and access to bank loans help to minimize downward bias against 
TVEs in the assessment.        
In our analysis, firm performance is measured by the growth instead of the level of each 
performance indicator.  Annual rates of growth, defined as the difference in the value of the variable in 
log form between periods t-1 and t, are derived for two proxy variables for labor productivity, TFP and 
worker earnings.  The growth of profitability is measured as change in the value of profits (not in log 
form) between the two periods because a large number of observations have negative values.  These 
growth measures difference away any fixed firm specific attributes that affect the level of performance 
indicators, making the estimates more robust to unobservable characteristics.  
We begin with the group-specific fixed effects model.  Let i, i=1,2..N, denote firms, j, j=1, 2…J 
denote ownership type, t, t=1, 2..T time period, k, k=1,2…K industrial branch. A reduced form  growth 
model is specified as follows: 
it t ki
K
k it
T
t it jit
or J
j
J
ji j it u LOAN IND YEAR X R D y + + + + + + + = −
− −
−
− − ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 1
1 1
1
3 2 1
0 η θ δ γ β α α  (1) 
In this model, yit is the rate of growth of labor productivity, TFP, or worker earnings (the change of 
profitability) for firm i between t-1 and t.  Dji is a time-invariant dummy variable equal to one if the firm i  
is registered as ownership type j in the last period of investigation and zero otherwise; Rjit is the reform 
variable equal to one if firm i operates as ownership type j in period t and zero otherwise. Xit-1 is the level 
of a given performance indicator (in log form for labor productivity, TFP and earnings and linear form for 
profits) at period t-1, which measures the initial condition of firm i. Yearit and INDki are the time and 
industrial branch dummy variables which are introduced to control for differences in the macroeconomic 
                                                           
6 The bank reform starting in 1994 that has substantially reduced the influence of township and village 
government on credit allocation has been regarded as one of the main factors contributing to the demise 
of TVEs in the later 1990s (Park and Shen, 2002).  Privatization, however, has made bank loans even 
more inaccessible to rural enterprises.  Using the data on banks and TVEs in Jiangsu and Zhejiang, Brandt 
and Li (2003) find that both private firms and privatized TVEs were about 50% and 25% less likely to 
obtain a loan than township enterprises and that the loans obtained by private or privatized firms were 
considerably smaller than were those obtained by TVEs that remained under local government ownership.   
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environment and market structure. LOAN is amount of loans per worker lagged by one period (its 
summary statistics are reported in Table 1). uit represents the random disturbances of the model.  
The parameters, βj, measuring the treatment effects, i.e. the impact of a shift to ownership type j 
on firm performance, are the focus of our analysis.  The fixed group effects, αj, capture the difference in 
performance between ownership types due to unobservable group-specific characteristics.  With the 
reform effects being controlled for, αj for a reformed category represents the pre-reform performance of 
the firms in that group relative to the omitted group, which is the unreformed SOEs in the regressions 
using ownership code indicators and the urban enterprises under 100% public ownership in the 
regressions with ownership dummies defined by degree of private ownership.  Using the estimates of αj 
we test whether pre-reform performance played a role in selecting firms for restructuring in general or 
restructuring to particular types of ownership.    
Although the group fixed-effects model has the advantage of permitting some inferences to be 
drawn regarding the pre-reform performance of firms subsequently restructured (Earle and Telegdy, 
2001), this specification imposes a strong assumption that the firms within each group have similar 
unobserved characteristics associated with performance outcomes. This assumption may be implausible 
for an investigation involving a long reform process like the present one, because firms that were 
privatized earlier may possess different unobserved characteristics than those privatized in the later stage 
of the reform. To eliminate possible selection bias stemming from unobserved firm-specific 
characteristics correlated with performance outcomes, we estimate the reform effects on firm performance 
with a firm fixed-effects model.  This model is specified as  
it t it
t
t it jit
j
j i it u LOAN YEAR X R y + + + + + = − − ∑ ∑ 1 1 η δ γ β α    (2) 
where αi is a firm specific fixed effect which controls for selection bias as well as observable time-
invariant attributes such as market structure.   
  Equations (1) and (2) are estimated by OLS. A shortcoming of this estimation technique is that it 
assigns large weights to sample outliers, making the estimates sensitive to measurement error. Noticing 
that our data are quite noisy, we also estimated equation (1) with the robust OLS method, which down-
weights outliers, to check the robustness of the estimates. Since the results of robust OLS are 
substantively similar to those of OLS, only the OLS estimates are reported for the sake of streamlining 
the exposition.
7  Moreover, notwithstanding our efforts to control for selection bias, the fixed-effects 
model can only address such bias stemming from time-invariant unobservable attributes associated with 
performance.  Selection bias could be generated by a dynamic process in which the possibility of a firm 
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unable to apply this technique to equation (2).      12
being picked for restructuring or being restructured into a particular ownership type is correlated with the 
firm’s potential to raise rates of growth in the future. We are unable to test if the model is subject to this 
type of simultaneous bias in this study.  Controlling for this type of dynamic selection bias requires that 
there be instrumental variables that are correlated with ownership change but not with the growth of a 
performance indicator.  Unfortunately, our data do not contain such variables.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
  Tables 4 and 6 present, respectively, OLS estimates of equations (1) and (2) for all five 
performance measures, with 4a and 6a for the regressions based on ownership-category shift and 4b and 
6b for the regressions on degrees of privatization.  As indicated by F statistics presented at each table, all 
the growth regressions are highly significant with p-value approaching to zero.  Although the coefficients 
on reform variables are the primary interest of our analysis, we first examine the estimates of those 
variables controlling for the initial condition, access to bank loans, and macroeconomic environment.
8   
As expected, the initial level of performance for all measures has a significantly negative coefficient in all 
runs, displaying a salient trend of convergence in performance among sample firms.  Also consistent with 
economic intuition, the estimates for loan per worker indicate that access to bank credit has significantly 
positive effect on the growth of value-added per worker, revenues per worker, and TFP, but has no 
significant impact on profits in all the regressions.   Regarding the impact of bank credits on worker 
earnings, the two regression models generate different results, with significantly positive estimates 
obtained from the group fixed-effects model and insignificant ones from the firm fixed-effects model.   
The estimates of year dummy variables document a positive trend of growth in labor productivity, 
TFP and worker earnings over the period of investigation. However, these estimates report no significant 
improvement in financial performance over the sample period and a significant fall in profits in 1997 
when the economy was adversely affected by the Asian financial crisis.   The stagnation of profitability in 
the face of rising productivity has been a general pattern for China’s state industry following the large 
scale of enterprise downsizing in the late 1990s (Dong, 2003).  The labor retrenchment has increased 
sharply productivity of SOEs but led to only moderate improve in their financial records as viable SOEs 
were still responsible for 30 to 100 percent of the expenditures of supporting xiagang workers and 
internally retired employees.  After reviewing the estimates of the aforementioned controlling variables, 
in the remaining section, we examine the patterns of selection bias and the impact of reforms on firm 
performance.  
   13
Selection Bias  
We begin with the estimates of group effects reported in Tables 4a and 4b.  The F statistics 
presented at the bottom of each table reject the hypothesis of zero group effects at the 5% level or higher 
in all the regressions. Part of group heterogeneity in performance is attributable to the longstanding gap 
between different types of public enterprises. As indicated by the estimates, the growth of TFP and 
profitability is significantly higher in the rural TVEs than the urban SOEs and collectives, whereas a 
reversed pattern of growth gap in worker earnings between the two sectors is observed.  Within the urban 
sector, compared with the unreformed SOEs (i.e., SOEs that were not to be reformed by 2001), the 
unreformed UCs are significantly more profitable, and both the reformed and unreformed UCs have lower 
rates of growth in worker earnings.   
     While these results are reassuring, our primary interest in group effects is to test if pre-reform 
performance has been a determinant of the reform policy regarding which firm is selected for 
restructuring or being transformed to a particular type of ownership.
9  From the group effects estimates, 
we calculate the performance gap between the firms with different reform status or ownership structure 
and present these estimates and their t statistics in Table 5.  From the estimates derived from the reform-
effects regressions, we notice that the SOEs and UCs that were picked for reform appear to be among the 
firms with worse pre-reform performance records within the sector.  Evidently, the pre-reform rates of 
growth are significantly lower (-12.3% in revenue per worker and -4.6% in worker earnings) for SOEs 
subsequently reformed relative to those never reformed; a significant lower growth of profits per unit of 
assets (-5%) is observed for the eventually reformed UCs prior to the restructuring.  By contrast, there is 
no significant pre-reform performance gap in any efficiency measure between the reformed and 
unreformed TVEs, although the pre-reform growth in worker earnings is significantly higher for the 
reformed TVEs compared with those unreformed. 
The indications that the ownership reform in the urban sector was targeting the worse performing 
firms are supported by the statistics obtained from the private-ownership-effects regressions.  The 
estimates on the group dummy for urban public controlled (i.e., minority privatized) enterprises, 
significant at the 5% level, imply that the pre-privatization growth of those firms is lower by 16.5% in 
value-added per worker, by 20.2% in revenues per worker, by 14.8% in TFP and by 4.9% in earnings than 
the growth in the enterprise that remained 100% publicly owned. The pre-reform growth is also 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
8 The estimates of industrial branches are omitted from the discussion for the sake of streamlining the 
exposition.   
9 Recall that group status for different type of public enterprise is determined at the beginning of the 
sample period, and that we assign enterprises that are found to have undergone privatization and those 
that did not, as of the end of the sample period, to different groups in order to investigate possible 
differences leading to subsequent selection.   14
significantly lower for those urban enterprises that subsequently become majority privately owned than 
for the never privatized urban enterprises by all measures, but only the estimate of –0.89 for worker 
earnings is statistically significant.  The pre-reform records of the majority privately owned enterprises in 
labor productivity and TFP are slightly better than those of the minority privatized enterprises, but the 
differences are statistically insignificant.  Comparing the two types of eventually privatized TVEs with 
those remaining 100% publicly owned, we notice that the privatized TVEs have higher growth in most 
performance measures but the gap is significant only for revenues per worker.   
In studies of privatization in Eastern Europe, the authors often find either no evidence of 
ownership-related bias in the selection of firms for privatization (Frydman, et. al., 1999) or, if there is a 
bias, that it is firms with higher pre-privatization growth that tend to be picked for privatization (Earle and 
Teledgy, 2001), as is found to be the case for rural firms in the present study.  Our finding that reformed 
urban enterprises tended to be among those with lower pre-reform productivity growth therefore calls for 
some comment.  One possible explanation is that the revenue-conscious governments face a more binding 
wealth constraint on the part of the buyers when privatizing productive, large enterprises than when 
selling non-productive or small enterprises.  Another possibility is that, unlike in post-Communist Eastern 
European countries where the authorities are fully committed to creating a private-enterprise economy, 
those overseeing the state sector in China want to keep the best enterprises in state hands, and they thus 
begin privatization by targeting those enterprises that have been performing most poorly.  Recall that the 
ownership restructuring of China’s public sector is introduced with the intention of maintaining state 
ownership for large enterprises and privatizing only small- and medium-size ones, as described by the 
slogan of “grasp the large and let go of the small”.  A third explanation is perhaps that privatization may 
meet stronger and more effective resistance from urban workers than rural workers (Dong, 2003).  Unlike 
TVE workers, workers in SOEs and large urban collectives are entitled to job security and welfare 
benefits, such as medical care and retirement pensions.  However, the urban workers’ entitlements are 
closely linked to the financial situation of the firm. The costs of privatization to workers in the money-
losing enterprises are relatively low because these firms had already experienced great difficulty to pay 
workers on time, reimburse medical expenses, and meet their obligations to contribute to pension funds 
prior to the restructuring.  Thus, these workers are likely to be more supportive of privatization than their 
counterparts in better performing public firms in the urban sector.  
Reform and Firm Performance 
We first look at the estimates of reform effects for the group fixed-effects regressions.  The 
estimates presented in Table 4a indicate that ownership restructuring has positive effects on the 
performance of reformed SOEs by all four efficiency measures with each estimate being significant at the 
1% level.  According to the point estimates, quantitatively, the ownership reform has raised the annual   15
rate of growth by 25.6% for value-added per worker, 19.2% for sales revenues per worker, 27.6% for 
TFP, and the annual growth of profits per unit of assets by 3.1%.
10  These strikingly large estimates are 
compatible with findings of some empirical studies on transition economics. For instance, Frydman et. al., 
(1999) reported that privatization increased the annual rate of growth of revenues per worker by 16.4% 
for the firms that were privatized to private financial institutes in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland.  Earle and Telegdy (2001) estimated that the annual rate of growth in labor productivity in the 
firms privatized to foreign investors increased by 19.1% in the post-privatization period in Romania.  In 
contrast to the remarkable positive estimates obtained for the state sector, none of the estimates on 
efficiency indicators for the urban collectives and the rural TVEs are found to be statistically significant. 
The enterprise restructuring does not have significant impact on the growth of worker earnings for any of 
the three sectors.     
  While the estimates presented in Table 4a shed light on average effects of ownership reforms for 
each type of public enterprises, the regression results in Table 4b permit inferences to be drawn regarding 
the relationship between the proportion of ownership in private hands and firm performance.  These 
estimates document positive, significant effect of the shift from wholly public ownership to majority 
public ownership in the urban sector on all performance measures.  The point estimates imply 26.0% 
higher growth in value-added per workers, 23.9% in revenues per worker, 26.6% in TFP, and 6.1% in 
worker earnings, and 3.4% in profits per unit of assets for the urban enterprises that shifted to partial but 
not majority private ownership relative to their pre-privatization performance, with all the estimates 
significant at the 5% level or higher.
11  By contrast, the estimates of privatization effects on all four 
efficiency measures are insignificant for the urban enterprises that reached or exceeded the threshold of 
51% private ownership and for both types of privatized rural enterprise regardless of whether they 
remained predominately owned by the local government or came under majority ownership by private 
investors.  However, except for the rural enterprises under majority private ownership, the post-
privatization growth of worker earnings is significantly higher, 6.1% for those urban enterprises under 
minority private ownership, 8.7% for majority privately owned urban enterprises, and 6.7% for the 
majority publicly owned rural enterprises.     
The results presented in Tables 4 control for selection bias at the group level. As mentioned 
earlier, the group specific fixed effects model does not control for selection bias resulting from the 
                                                           
10 The point estimates by robust OLS regressions are somewhat smaller, 9.0% for value-added per worker, 
11.5% for revenues per worker, 9.5% for TFP, 1.0 percentage point for profits per unit of assets, and 
3.8% for earnings. All the estimates are significant at the 10% level or higher.    
11 The point estimates pf robust OLS for this specification are again smaller, 0.117 for value-added per 
worker, 0.110 for revenues per workers, 0.141 for TFP, 0.039 for earnings, and 0.004 for profits; except 
for profits, all the estimates are significant at the 5% level.      16
heterogeneity in unobservable productive attributes within the group.  The estimates of the firm specific 
fixed-effects model reported in Tables 6a and 6b eliminate the possibility of this type of selection bias.  
As indicated by the F statistics presented at the bottom, all the regressions are highly significant, and the 
hypothesis of zero firm-specific fixed effects is rejected for every equation.   Consistent with those for 
group-level controls, the estimates show that the ownership reform has significant, positive effects on the 
growth in value-added per worker (27.1%), revenues per worker (14.8%), TFP (32.9%) and profits per 
unit of assets (3.8%) for the SOEs, and that the post-privatization growth in those partially privatized but 
still majority publicly owned urban enterprises is significantly higher, 17.8% for value-added per worker, 
19.8% for revenues per worker, 20.7% for TFP, 4.7% for profits, and 6.8% for worker earnings.  The 
results of the firm fixed effects regressions also show once again that the shift from wholly public 
ownership to one dominated by private investors does not have any significant impact on performance 
among urban enterprises.  However, the firm fixed effects model provides a different assessment of 
reform effects for the UCs and the TVEs.  With those statistically significant estimates, the regressions 
document lower post-reform growth in value-added per worker and TFP for the reformed UCs.  These 
estimates also show higher post-reform growth in TFP (14.4%) and profits (2%) for the reformed TVEs, 
higher growth in revenues per worker (15.1%) for the partially privatized but still majority publicly 
owned rural enterprises, and higher growth in TFP (10.8%) and in profits (2.1%) for rural enterprises that 
became majority privately owned.  The magnitude of these effects in the TVEs are, however, small 
relative to those in the reformed SOEs and those for the public controlled urban enterprises.   
 
5. Conclusions 
  In this paper, we’ve taken a preliminary look at ownership reform in both urban and rural 
enterprises in and around Nanjing municipality using data specifically collected for this purpose from 168 
enterprises covering the years 1994 to 2001.  We’ve focused both on the effects of ownership change on 
performance as measured by growth rates of productivity, profits and worker earnings, and on differences 
in pre-reform performance between firms selected and those not selected for privatization.  Our results 
conform with expectations in that they show the shift towards more private forms of property rights to be 
associated with improvements in performance outcomes in most cases.   
  Our results are unexpected and noteworthy in two main respects.  First, we’ve found that whereas 
among rural enterprises, it was the better pre-reform performers that tended to be selected for 
privatization, among urban enterprises this situation is reversed.  The latter outcome differs from what is 
found in transition economies in Eastern European.  Second, we’ve found that among reformed urban 
enterprises, those in which private ownership accounts for less than 50% of shares performed better than   17
those in which the majority of shares are owned privately.  There is, it seems, a U-shaped relationship 
between the degree of privatization and the level of performance.  
  Perhaps both findings are related to the more gradual—one might alternatively say more reluctant 
and incomplete—nature of SOE privatization in China as compared to the no longer Communist-ruled 
transition economies.  Provincial and municipal government officials in Nanjing may be in no rush to 
privatize well-performing state enterprises.  And enterprises with substantial public ownership may still 
have privileged access to certain resources in China’s semi-reformed environment, making mixed 
ownership still superior to either fully private or fully public ownership.  The paucity of large 
concentrations of funds in private hands with which to purchase successful urban enterprises, when 
combined with the authorities’ unwillingness to sell off firms at sharply slashed  prices or to lauch 
voucher schemes, may also help to explain the earlier privatization of weaker  rather than of stronger 
urban enterprises in our sample.   
The smaller scale of many rural firms may mean that in the rural sector, insider privatization is 
feasible even for more successful enterprises.  Perhaps township and village officials and enterprise 
managers also have closer personal and family ties in rural than in urban areas.  Officials deciding which 
rural enterprises to privatize have a greater likelihood of being direct personal beneficiaries of 
privatization—i.e., they will be among, or in the immediate circle of, the owners—while for urban 
officials the main effect of privatization may be a loss of personal power.   
Our data set is unusually rich in information about the distribution of ownership stakes both 
immediately after ownership change, and after passage of a few years. In future research, we hope to look 
more directly at the causes and consequences of differences in the degree of insider versus outsider 
ownership, and in the degree to which ownership is spread among both managers and workers or is 
concentrated in the hands of managers, especially top managers.  Among the questions to be investigated 
is whether there is evidence of more widely shared forms of ownership, profit-sharing, and control rights 
within privatized rural or urban enterprises, and whether enterprises exhibiting such forms of worker 
participation exhibit systematic differences in productivity, wages, and employment outcomes.   18
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Table 1: Main Characteristics of SOEs, UCs, and TVEs 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 SOEs Urban  collectives  TVEs 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
GVIO (million yuan)   
Mean     487.54  32.66  23.12       
Standard deviation  1,474.52  44.50  31.17 
NVFA (million yuan)      
Mean      306.47    7.07    4.03 
Standard deviation  1,044.94    9.31   6.86 
Employment (workers) 
Mean 2,925  430  217 
Standard deviation  5,052      378  208 
Equity 
Mean (million yuan)    177.57       6.82  3.16  
Standard deviation    592.46       9.77  5.83 
Loan per worker   
Mean (1,000 yuan)  23.5  3.2  4.6 
Standard deviation  54.9  12.1  12.3 
 
No. of firms  60      10  95 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Notes: The statistics presented in this table are derived from the enterprise panel data set.  
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Ownership Reforms     
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Distribution of sample firms by ownership categories:
1 
 
Year  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999  2000 2001 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SOEs  54 54 58 59 60 60  60 60 
State-owned  47 46 46 46 36 28  22 22 
Shareholding company  
  2 2 3 3 8 10  10  11 
Limited company 
  5 6 9 10  12  17  21  20 
Shareholding cooperative  
  0 0 0 0 3 4  5 5 
Private  firm  0 0 0 0 1 1  2 2 
 
%  of  reformed  13.0 14.8 20.7 22.0 40.0 46.7  63.3 63.3 
 
UCs:  10 10 10 10 10 10  10 10 
Collective  8 9 9 9 6 5  3 2 
Shareholding cooperative 
  0 0 0 0 2 2  3 3 
Limited company 
  1 1 1 1 2 3  4 5 
 
%  of  reformed  10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 20.0 30.0  40.0 50.0 
 
TVEs:  87 89 91 93 95 95  95 95    
Collective  87 89 89 88 65 46  13 4 
Shareholding cooperative 
  0 0 0 0 13  21  23  23 
Limited company 
  0 0 0 2 3 4  6 6 
Private  firm  0 0 2 3 14  24  53  62 
 
%  of  reformed  0.0 0.0 2.2 5.4 17.9  29.5  62.1  71.6   
  
Extent of privatization: 
  Urban enterprises
2  Rural enterprises  
  Average share of equity owned    Average share of equity owned  
     Year |   Publicly   Privately   Publicly  Privately  
----------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
     1994 |  0.962  0.038  0.994  0.006   
     1995 |   0.965  0.035  0.980  0.020 
     1996 |  0.928   0.072  0.928  0.072 
     1997 |  0.925  0.075  0.896  0.104 
     1998 |   0.850  0.150  0.754  0.246 
     1999 |  0.829  0.171  0.628  0.372 
     2000 |  0.800        0.200   0.354  0.645 
     2001 |   0.746   0.254  0.311  0.689 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   22
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Ownership Reforms  (continued)   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Urban enterprises  Rural enterprises 
Proportion of firms with ownership   Proportion of firms with ownership  
    Year |   100%   Public     Private     100%   Public  Private 
  Public   Controlled  Controlled   Public    Controlled  Controlled 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     1994 |     0.770  0.230  0.0  0.929  0.071  0.0 
     1995 |     0.785  0.215     0.0  0.899  0.101  0.0 
     1996 |  0.768  0.203  0.029  0.828  0.129  0.043 
     1997 |  0.775  0.197  0.028  0.779  0.137  0.084 
     1998 |  0.625  0.264  0.111  0.594  0.177  0.229 
     1999 |     0.556  0.333  0.111  0.427  0.187  0.386 
     2000 |     0.486  0.403  0.111  0.125  0.208  0.656 
     2001 |  0.431  0.403  0.167  0.094  0.167  0.729 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 
Distribution of private ownership
3 
  
  Urban Enterprises  Rural Enterprises 
  Management Employees Outsiders  Management  Employees Outsiders 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Right after reform 
 0.416  0.218  0.366  0.531  0.179  0.289 
In 2001 
 0.369  0.337  0.294  0.613  0.162  0.225 
 
Payments by inside private investors 
 
    Urban enterprises    Rural enterprises  
   Management  Employees  Management  Employees 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Payment expected as % of the value of share they owned 
  76.05%   88.01%   86.19%  83.72% 
 
Payment arrangement: 
Proportion of the investors paying a lump sum up front 
 80.48%  93.55%    73.33%  86.20% 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   
Notes:  1. A firm is defined as reformed if the firm has undergone restructuring to the extent that it leads 
to a substantive change of its ownership code by China’s National Statistical Bureau.       
2. Urban enterprises include SOEs and UCs. The two types of urban public firms are combined 
because the sample size of collectives is small and the two types of firms are similar in terms of extent of 
privatization. 
3. The statistics presented prior to this part of Table 2 are obtained from the enterprise panel data 
and those reported in the remaining table are from the manager survey.  
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Table 4a. Estimates of Group Fixed-Effects Model (Reform Effects)  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
  Val.-added Revenues  TFP  Profits/  Earnings 
     Per worker   per worker      assets  per worker 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Reform effects 
Ref.  SOEs  0.256    0.192 0.276 0.031  0.045 
  (3.35)***  (3.09)***  (3.57)***  (2.96)***  (1.57) 
Ref. UCs   -0.143    -0.066  -0.044  0.006  0.003 
  (-0.73)   (-0.40)  (-0.22)  (0.21)  (0.04) 
Ref. TVEs  0.046    -0.039  0.092  0.012  -0.016 
  (0.74)   (-0.75)  (1.45)  (1.38)  (-0.69) 
Group effects 
Ref.  SOEs  -0.098      -0.123 -0.059 -0.008  -0.049 
  (-1.31)  (-2.03)** (-0.79)  (-0.82)  (-1.83)* 
Uref. UCs   0.012  -0.034  0.117  0.031  -0.049 
  (0.12)   (-0.41)  (1.16)  (2.16)**  (-1.28) 
Ref. UCs  -0.134  -0.125  -0.152 -0.022  -0.090 
  (-0.82)   (-0.94)  (-0.95)  (-0.98)  (-1.48) 
Uref.  TVEs    0.097  0.059 0.228 0.041  -0.144 
  (1.53)   (1.15)  (3.54)***  (4.53)***    (-5.53)*** 
Ref.  TVEs    0.102    0.123 0.195 0.032  -0.088 
  (1.76)*   (2.59)***  (3.32)***  (3.91)***  (-3.69)*** 
 
Initial level of   -0.200  -0.160 -0.219 -0.488  -0.236 
Performance  (-10.29)*** (-9.37)***  (-10.72)*** (-18.40)***  (-12.97)*** 
Loan/worker  0.002     0.002   0.001   0.000    0.0004 
  (3.47)***  (3.69)***  (2.15)** (0.08)    (1.69)* 
Time effects  
1996   0.141   0.060  0.122  -0.003  0.042 
  (2.17)**   (1.12)  (1.87)*  (-0.35)    (1.71)* 
1997   0.127   0.083  0.141  -0.021  0.047 
  (1.97)**   (1.57)  (2.19)** (-2.31)**    (1.91)* 
1998   0.160   0.060  0.169  0.004      0.122 
  (2.47)**   (1.11)  (2.61)***  (0.43)  (4.95)*** 
1999   0.202   0.089  0.197  -0.004  0.080 
  (3.05)***  (1.64)*  (2.99)***  (-0.41)    (3.19)*** 
2000   0.091   0.091  0.093    0.004  0.134 
  (1.30)   (1.57)    (1.32)  (0.37)    (5.04)*** 
2001   0.173   0.110  0.180  0.001  0.130 
  (2.40)**   (1.84)*  (2.51)***  (0.03)  (4.73)*** 
 
Industrial branch effects: 
  Yes   yes  yes  yes      yes 
 
Constant   0.525   0.703  0.211  0.015      2.089 
  (4.55)***  (6.67)***  (2.00)** (1.06)  (12.57)*** 
F-test  
On zero slop  5.36    5.18  5.97  13.79   8.34 
p-value   0.0   0.0  0.0  0.0    0.0 
F-test  
On group effects  1.62    3.66  3.97  7.17      7.57 
p-value    0.15  0.0 0.0 0.0      0.0 
Adjusted R
2  0.11      0.10 0.13 0.24     0.15 
Observations  1,114    1,124 1,084 1,124      1,115 
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Table 4b:  Estimates of Group Fixed-effects Model (Privatization Effects)  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
   Val.-added Revenue  TFP  Profits/  Earnings 
     Per worker   per worker      assets   per worker 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Privatization effects 
Urban  public  0.260  0.239 0.266 0.034  0.061 
controlled (3.43)***  (3.86)***    (3.55)***  (3.18)*** (2.15)** 
Urban private-  0.016  -0.001  0.005  0.020  0.087 
controlled    (0.13)  (-0.01)  (0.04)    (1.11)     (1.82)* 
Rural public   0.116  0.083  0.121  0.015  0.067 
controlled     (1.55)  (1.34)  (1.63)  (1.48)  (2.36)** 
Rural private-     0.020  -0.034  0.057  0.007  0.004 
controlled   (0.32)  (-0.66)  (0.90)  (0.81)     (0.15) 
Group effects   
Urban public  -0.166  -0.202  -0.147    -0.015     -0.049 
controlled (-2.31)**  (-3.44)***  (-2.07)**  (-1.52)   (-1.81)* 
Urban  private-  -0.122  -0.137 -0.054 -0.016      -0.089 
controlled  (-1.14)  (-1.57) (-0.51) (-1.11)  (-2.25)** 
Rural  100%  0.036 -0.053  0.129    0.021     -0.100 
Publicly owned  (0.44)  (-0.77)  (1.48)  (1.78)*    (-3.10)*** 
Rural  public  0.052  0.085 0.143 0.022  -0.108 
controlled (0.64) (1.31)  (1.79)*  (1.97)**  (-3.46)*** 
Rural  private-  0.063  0.083 0.133 0.029  -0.108 
controlled  (1.08)  (1.75)* (2.24)* (3.54)***    (-4.20)*** 
 
Initial level of   -0.195  -0.166 -0.209 -0.486      -0.218 
Performance (-9.98)***  (-9.61)*** (-7.02)*** (-18.28)***  (-12.10)*** 
Loan/worker  0.002    0.002 0.001   -0.000    0.0004 
   (3.59)***  (4.04)***  (1.98)** (-0.20)    (2.07)** 
Time effects  
1996    0.139    0.069 0.122 -0.004  0.046 
   (2.12)**  (1.30)  (1.87)*  (-0.41)    (1.87)* 
1997    0.128  0.096 0.146 -0.021      0.050 
   (1.97)**  (1.81)*  (2.25)** (-2.31)**    (2.05)* 
1998    0.162  0.073 0.176   0.004      0.119 
   (2.46)**  (1.36)  (2.68)***  (0.43)      (4.81)*** 
1999    0.207  0.105 0.207 -0.003      0.074 
   (3.08)***  (1.91)*  (3.10)***  (-0.35)    (2.91)*** 
2000    0.100  0.104 0.111 0.005      0.122 
   (1.41)  (1.79)*  (1.57)  (0.54)      (4.60)*** 
2001    0.185  0.124 0.203 0.002      0.115 
   (2.55)***  (2.09)** (2.82)***  (0.22)      (4.20)*** 
Industrial branch effects: 
   Yes   yes  yes  yes      yes 
Constant    0.586  0.787 0.277 0.023  1.945 
   (4.88)***  (7.21)***  (2.53)** (1.56)      (11.80)*** 
F-test  
On zero slop  4.99  5.34  5.52  13.11     7.31 
p-value    0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0      0.0 
F-test on  
Group  effects  1.78  4.36 3.10 5.28  5.18 
p-value   0.12  0.0  0.01  0.0  0.0   
Adjusted R
2  0.09  0.10 0.10 0.23  0.14 
Observations  1,112  1,122 1,082 1,122      1,113 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------    27
Notes:  Dependent variables of val.-added per worker, revenue per worker, TFP (total factor productivity), and 
earnings per worker are measured as annual rates of growth, and the dependent variable of profits per yuan of assets 
is a change between periods t-1 and t.   *, **, and *** indicates the level of significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.      28
 
Table 5:  Tests for Differential Group Effects   
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Val-added Revenue    TFP  Profits/  Earnings 
     Per worker   per worker    assets   per worker 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Tests based on reform-effects regressions 
 
H0: reformed SOEs - unreformed SOEs = 0 
Performance  gap  -0.098  -0.123 -0.059 -0.008 -0.051   
T statistic   -1.31  -2.03** -0.79    -0.80  -1.83*   
 
H0: reformed urban collectives – unreformed urban collectives = 0 
Performance  gap  -0.122  -0.091    -0.034 -0.050 -0.046   
T statistic  -0.63   -0.48    -1.18    -2.71***  -1.01 
 
H0: reformed TVEs – unreformed TVEs = 0   
Performance  gap  0.005    0.065    -0.033 -0.009 0.057 
T statistic   0.10    1.35    -0.57   -1.36  2.63*** 
 
 
Test based on privatization-effects regressions 
Urban sector:   
H0: Public controlled – 100% publicly owned = 0 
Performance gap  -0.165  -0.202  -0.148   -0.016  -0.049 
T statistic  -2.31**  -3.44***  -2.07**  -1.52  -1.81* 
 
H0: Private controlled – 100% publicly owned = 0 
Performance  gap  -0.122  -0.138   -0.054    -0.016 -0.089 
T statistic  -1.14   -1.57    -0.51    -1.11  -2.25** 
 
H0: Private controlled – public controlled = 0  
Performance  gap  0.043     0.065   0.014    -0.001  -0.041 
T statistic   0.40       0.72    0.87     0.00  -1.00 
 
Rural sector:  
H0: Public controlled – 100% publicly owned = 0 
Performance  gap  0.015    0.138   0.014  0.002 -0.007 
T statistic  0.14    1.71*    0.14   0.10  -0.20 
 
H0: Private controlled – 100% publicly owned = 0 
Performance gap  0.026   0.136     0.004   0.009  0.001 
T statistic  0.32    1.99**     0.00    0.99  0.00 
 
H0: Private controlled – public dominant = 0  
Performance  gap  0.012   -0.003  -0.010   0.007  0.008   
T statistic   0.17    -0.00  -0.14    0.88  0.30  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Notes:  *, **, and *** indicates the level of significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.      29
Table 6a: Estimates of Firm Fixed-Effects Model (Reform Effects)    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Dependent   Val.-added  Revenue   TFP  Profits/  Earnings 
Variable      Per worker   per worker        assets   per worker 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Reform effects:  
Reformed SOE    0.271  0.148  0.329  0.038  -0.007 
  (3.02)***  (2.04)**  (3.70)*** (3.09)*** (-0.20) 
Reformed  UC  -0.393 -0.263 -0.371  0.012  -0.092 
 (-1.84)*  (-1.46)  (-1.77)*  (0.41)  (-1.14) 
Reformed  TVE  0.067 0.019 0.144  0.020  -0.013 
  (1.07) (0.36) (2.32)**  (2.30)**  (-0.55) 
 
Initial level of  -0.663  -0.584  -0.685 -0.869 -0.663 
performance  (-21.65)*** (-20.38)*** (-22.33)***  (-27.48)***  (-23.37)*** 
Loan/per  worker  0.002 0.002 0.001  -0.000    0.0002     
  (3.35)*** (2.87)*** (2.01)**  (-0.37)  (0.77) 
Time effects: 
1996  0.107 0.083 0.056  -0.008  0.038 
  (1.86)* (1.71)* (0.98)  (-0.93)  (1.75)* 
1997  0.140 0.152 0.100  -0.028  0.058 
 (2.44)**  (3.15)***  (1.76)*  (-3.44)***  (2.65)*** 
1998  0.214 0.182 0.159  -0.011  0.153 
  (3.66)*** (3.68)*** (2.75)***  (-1.37)  (6.93)*** 
1999  0.310 0.247 0.221  -0.013  0.157 
  (5.14)*** (4.82)*** (3.72)***  (-1.60)  (6.80)*** 
2000  0.264 0.288 0.162  -0.007  0.230 
  (4.00)*** (5.13)*** (2.50)***  (-0.74)  (9.14)*** 
2001  0.359 0.346 0.258  -0.006  0.262 
  (5.31)*** (5.95)*** (3.88)***  (-0.64)  (9.90)*** 
Constant  1.808 2.328 1.068  0.032  5.549 
  (19.11)*** (19.93)*** (15.75)***  (5.31)***  (23.29)*** 
 
R
2  0.086 0.056 0.091  0.202  0.010 
F statistic on zero slop: 
  46.56 39.60 48.85  71.87  53.41 
p  value  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 
F statistic on zero fixed effects: 
  2.87 2.84 3.07  2.91  3.09 
p  value  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 
 
Observations  1,114 1,124 1,084  1,128  1,115 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   30
Table 6b: Estimates of Firm Fixed-Effects Model (Privatization Effects)    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Dependent   Val.-added  Revenue   TFP  Profits/  Earnings 
Variable      Per worker   per worker        assets   per worker 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Privatization effects: 
Urban public  0.178     0.198  0.207  0.047  0.068 
Controlled  (1.99)**  (2.65)***     (2.34)**   (3.78)***   (2.02)* 
Urban private    -0.178  -0.105  -0.147  0.018  -0.016   
Controlled (-1.33)  (-0.94)  (-1.08)  (0.94)  (-0.33) 
Rural public      0.128  0.151  0.079  -0.003  0.045 
Controlled        (1.49)  (2.09)**  (0.93)  (-0.23)  (1.41) 
Rural private    0.039  0.002  0.108  0.022  0.009 
Controlled  (0.60) (0.21) (1.68)*  (2.38)**  (0.40) 
 
Initial level of    -0.672  -0.585  -0.678 -0.875 -0.655 
Performance  (-21.80)*** (-20.37)*** (-21.93)***  (-27.54)***  (-22.86)*** 
Loan/per  worker  0.003 0.002 0.002  0.000  0.0003 
  (3.54)*** (3.14)*** (2.18)**  (0.05)  (0.99) 
Time effects:        
1996      0.107  0.087  0.061  -0.007  0.039 
  (1.85)* (1.80)* (1.06)  (-0.85)  (1.77)* 
1997      0.141  0.157  0.109  -0.027  0.057 
 (2.44)**  (3.25)***  (1.89)*  (-3.30)***  (2.63)*** 
1998     0.225  0.189  0.178  -0.010  0.148 
  (3.79)*** (3.25)*** (3.01)***  (-1.23)  (6.64)*** 
1999     0.324    0.254  0.243  -0.013  0.146 
  (5.27)*** (3.79)*** (4.00)***  (-1.47)  (6.29)*** 
2000     0.284  0.291  0.196  -0.005  0.211 
  (4.26)*** (5.21)*** (2.99)***  (-0.60)  (8.41)*** 
2001     0.386  0.356  0.298  -0.004  0.242 
  (5.65)*** (6.15)*** (4.44)***  (-0.51)  (9.21)*** 
Constant    1.795 2.309 1.053  0.030  5.473 
  (18.72)*** (19.69)*** (15.16)***  (4.82)***  (22.74)*** 
 
R
2      0.081    0.055   0.087   0.198    0.095 
F statistic on zero slop: 
  41.89 36.73 43.14  66.22  46.99 
p-value    0.0    0.0   0.0   0.0    0.0 
F statistic on zero firm-fixed effects: 
  2.84 2.88 2.97  2.90  2.98 
p-value  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 
Observations  1,112    1,112  1,082 1,122 1,113 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Notes:  Dependent variables of val.-added per worker, revenue per worker, TFP (total factor 
productivity), and earnings per worker are measured as annual rates of growth, and the dependent variable 
of profits per yuan of assets is a change between periods t-1 and t.   *, **, and *** indicates the level of 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.    
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